REVEALED! The Japan–US Rice War Drama That Shook the World: From Crop Crisis to GATT Tariffication!

A. IDENTIFICATION

 

1. The Issue

This case involves the United States, which demanded that Japan replace all of its import bans and quotas on rice with tariffs—a policy known as “tariffication”—through the GATT Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations.

On September 30, 1993, the Japanese government decided to enter the international rice market on a major scale for the first time in three decades. Due to a cool, wet summer and an outbreak of blight, Japan faced its worst rice harvest in the postwar period—only 74% of the previous year’s harvest—and was forced to purchase, on an emergency basis, foreign rice over the next 12 months (two metric tons, about one-fifth of annual consumption) to bridge the supply shortfall.

Consequently, Japan became the largest rice importer in the world. On December 14, 1993, the Japanese government accepted a limited opening of the rice market under the GATT plan. However, the bumper rice crop in 1994 resulted in much of the imported rice piling up unused in warehouses nationwide.

In 1994, Japan harvested 11.98 million tons of rice, compared with 7.83 million tons the previous year. (This situation is similar to the Japan Apple Imports case; see the APPLE case for comparison.)

[Source: Cordy, Jennifer. “Growing Japanese Rice Glut is Causing a Sticky Situation for Foreign Growers,” Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, September 5, 1994, p.A4.]

 

2. Description

This dispute emerged in the context of bilateral trade negotiations between the United States and Japan. The logic behind the U.S. demand for Japan’s market opening was largely derived from the U.S.’s US$50 billion trade deficit with Japan.

[Smith, Charles. “Staple of Dispute: Tokyo Hints at Concessions on Rice Trade,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.155, no.40, October 28, 1993, p.33.]

Thus, the GATT proposal became one element in the broader U.S.–Japan trade dispute. It represented a symbolic issue, reflecting Japan’s “sagging, heavily regulated” market, alongside sectors such as medical equipment, telecommunications, insurance, and auto parts.

[Sapsford, Jathon and Williams, Michael. “Panel Proposes Basic Shift in Japan Economic Policy,” Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 20, 1993, p.A7.]

Rice protectionism became a global symbol of Japanese market rigidity and a frequent target of criticism for Japan’s large trade surplus.

[The Economist, “The Voice of Rice: Korean for Protection,” vol.7841, no.329, December 11, 1993, p.34.]

Japanese manufacturers, major beneficiaries of multilateral trade regimes, were concerned that a Japanese-instigated collapse of the Uruguay Round would harm their interests.

[Far Eastern Economic Review, “Away from the Brink: Japan on Defensive as GATT Talks Look to Restart,” December 23, 1992, p.53.]

In contrast, Japan argued that foreign rice imports must be restricted to ensure self-sufficiency in the country’s staple food. Globally, only 3–4% of world rice production (around 14 million tons) enters international trade. The U.S. share of world production is about 2%.

[The Economist, “Starters-and-Stripes Sushi: Rice Production,” November 27, 1993, p.30.]

 

The U.S. Rice Millers Association (RMA) initially requested a quota of up to 2.5% of the Japanese market. Although the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) rejected this request in October 1986, it agreed to include the issue in the 1987 Uruguay Round negotiations.

By 1993, the Clinton administration signaled it would act under Section 301 sanctions if Japan maintained its rice import ban. Japan’s Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives and other domestic groups strongly opposed the move. Resistance came not only from farmers but also from consumers, sparking a nationwide debate in late 1993.

 

From Japan’s perspective, the issue extended beyond economics—it involved food self-sufficiency and cultural identity. In 1989, Japan was the world’s largest net agricultural importer, with a self-sufficiency ratio that had declined to 46% by 1991 (France: 143%; U.S.: 113%; West Germany: 94%).

Rice accounted for 26% of total caloric intake in Japan, down from 50% in 1960.

[Soda, Osamu. Fact about Japan: Japanese Agriculture, International Society for Educational Information, Tokyo, 1993, p.6.]

Calorie self-sufficiency declined steadily after World War II—73% (1965), 52% (1985), and 46% (1991). Among major food items such as wheat (12%), soybean (4%), beef (52%), and sugar (36%), only rice remained fully self-sufficient (100%).

[Soda, 1993, p.4.]

As of 1990, Japan’s total agricultural production value was 11.42 trillion yen, consisting of rice (28%), livestock (27%), vegetables (23%), fruit (9%), and others (13%).

Since domestic rice prices were about seven times higher than international prices, tariffication threatened to push farmers out of business and endanger rice self-sufficiency in the 21st century—a matter tied to national security.

Culturally, rice is central to Japanese life. The word gohan means both “rice” and “meal.” Thus, “Did you eat a meal?” literally translates to “Did you eat rice?”

Japan’s government predicted that substantial rice imports would not begin until late 1995 due to surplus stocks from the 1994 bumper harvest.

[Journal of Commerce, “Japanese Say Substantial Imports of Rice Unlikely Until Late 1995,” April 11, 1995, p.A5.]

 

3. Related Cases

Korean Case:

Korea also negotiated through GATT for rice market liberalization, accepting the same agreement as Japan with a 10-year moratorium. Prime Minister Kim Young Sam apologized to farmers for ending government protection and subsidies.

[Islam, Shanda. “A Deal, of Sorts: GATT Comes up with an 11th-Hour Global Trade Accord,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.156, no.50, December 23, 1993, p.54.]

However, the impact on Korea was more severe. In 1991, rice production accounted for 3.1% of Korea’s GNP, compared with Japan’s 0.6%. Korean farmers derived one-fourth of their income from rice, compared to one-eighth in Japan. The Korean Foreign Economic Institute estimated that the agreement would reduce Korea’s trade surplus with the U.S. by US$1.4 billion annually but cause losses of US$50 million per year for farmers.

[Hasegawa, Hiroshi, “Read the Six Years; After the Opening Rice Market,” Asahi Shinbun Weekly AREA, December 20, 1993, p.16–17.]

Keyword Clusters:

(1) Trade Product: Rice

(2) Bio-geography: Temperate

(3) Environmental Problem: Habitat Loss

Draft Author: Junko Saito

 

B. LEGAL CLUSTERS

5. Discourse and Status: Agreement and Complete

An agreement was reached on December 15, 1993. It stipulated that tariffication would take effect after a six-year period during which Japan would import between 4% (4 million tons) and 8% (8 million tons) of total consumption.
[Smith, Charles. “Rice Resolve: Tokyo Makes Last-Minute Concession on Imports,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.156, no.50, December 23, 1993, p.14.]

This agreement affected the Food Control Law, which granted the government broad powers over rice markets and import restrictions. Originally enacted during World War II, the law might need revision or reinterpretation to permit market liberalization.

 

6–8. Forum, Scope, and Legal Standing

• Forum and Scope: Japan and multilateral
• Decision Breadth: MULTI (USA, Thailand, Myanmar, etc.)
• Legal Standing: Treaty (GATT provision invoked; Japan lifted the rice import ban in December 1993)

Japan’s participation in the world rice trade significantly influenced global prices. Iwakura, Director General for Agricultural Policy at the Liberal Democratic Party, warned that Japan’s import of 1 million tons could sharply increase prices. Indeed, international prices rose steadily as Japan became a major player in the thin global rice market.

[Smith, Charles. “Steamed Up: Japan's Rice-Import Ban Stays, Despite Shortfall,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.156, no.41, October 14, 1993, p.73.]

At the same time, exports of Japanese rice-polishing equipment surged as Asian nations prepared for expanded global trade following the Uruguay Round. In 1995, Japanese manufacturers expected a 30–50% increase in export value.

[Japan Agrinfo Newsletter, vol.12, no.6, International Agricultural Council, Tokyo, February 1995, p.5.]

 

C. GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERS

• Geographic Domain: Asia
• Geographic Site: East Asia
• Geographic Impact: Japan
• Sub-National Factors: No
• Type of Habitat: Temperate

 

D. TRADE CLUSTERS

Japan agreed to import 4–8% of its total rice consumption between 1994 and 2000 under a “minimum access clause,” representing a transition toward tariffication.

Economic Data (1991–1992):

• Farmers as % of total population: 10.9%
• Number of farming households: 3.8 million (3.1%)
• Agricultural GDP share: 2.4%
• Rice production share: 0.6%
• Rice income share per household: 4%
• Full-time vs. part-time farmers: 12.1%
• Rice paddy area share: 13.7% of total land

Japan planned to import 200,000 metric tons of foreign rice by late 1993, mainly from Thailand. By 1994, imports reached 500,000–600,000 metric tons, with the remainder sourced from the U.S. and China.

[Owens, Cynthia. “Thai Could Get Big Boost if Japan Opens Rice Market,” Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 13, 1993, p.A20.]

 

E. ENVIRONMENT CLUSTERS

Environmental Problem Type: Source problem—potential rice paddy loss (DEFOR).

Rice paddies in Japan play an essential role in maintaining environmental balance, acting as greenbelts, water purifiers, and groundwater reservoirs.

Species:

• Name: Rice (Oryza sativa)
• Type: Japonica (short-grain, sticky when cooked)
• Diversity: N/A

Impact: Low–medium scale, lasting several years.

Substitutes: Conservation (CONSV).

 

VI. OTHER FACTORS

25. Culture: Yes

For the Japanese, the symbolic importance of rice is deeply rooted in their cosmology — rice as soul, rice as pure money, and ultimately, rice as self. During the Edo era (1603–1867), rice circulated as an intermediate form of currency. Sushi, one of Japan’s traditional dishes, originally emerged as a way to preserve fish by layering rice and fish alternately in a wooden pail for fermentation. Today, this traditional form is known as oshi-zushi.

Although the Japanese have eaten rice since ancient times, it was only after the nineteenth century that rice became the national staple food. Consequently, rice has been valued as a special food closely associated with rituals. Rice harvest ceremonies, both among the common people and at the imperial court, have long been a major cultural institution.

In ancient times, the Japanese emperor himself was the shaman who presided over rice harvest rituals. These ceremonies symbolized cosmic rejuvenation through an exchange of souls — that is, selves — as embodied in rice. People believed rice possessed mysterious supernatural powers. One ancient custom, for example, involved shaking rice inside bamboo so that a dying person could hear its sound at their deathbed. In mountain regions, rice was even referred to as “the Buddhist Saint (Bosatsu).” The Japanese word for “offering to the gods,” osonae, was used to describe rice cakes prepared for ritual services, reflecting the central role of rice in formal offerings to deities.

Rice was never regarded as a mere grain but as a personified being with a soul. Cultivating rice was viewed not simply as an economic activity but as a deeply spiritual and religious practice. Farmers embraced the notion of ina-dama, the soul of rice, and personified the crop itself. Even today, many people believe that the spirit of rice — known as the God of the Rice Paddy — dwells in the last rice stubble remaining after harvest. The person who reaps this final stalk traditionally brings it home and performs a small ceremony. This custom continues to be practiced in rice harvest rituals today.

Rice paddies have long been a recurring theme in Japanese art — depicted in woodblock prints, paintings, and even modern travel posters designed to entice urban residents to visit the countryside. They serve as intimate representations of agriculture, rural life, the changing seasons, and the nation’s past. As a metaphor for self, rice paddies embody one’s ancestral land, village, region, and ultimately, Japan itself. Thus, the Japanese people maintain a deep and enduring cultural attachment to rice.

 

26. Trans-Border: No

 

27. Rights: No

 

28. Relevant Literature

• Ohunuki-Tierney, Emiko. Rice as Self. Princeton University Press, 1993.
• Avery, P. William. World Agriculture and the GATT. Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993.
• Inoue, Hisashi. Inoue Hisashi no Kome Koza [Mr. Inoue's Lecture on Rice]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989.
• Inoue, Hisashi. Zoku-Inoue Hisashi no Kome Koza [Mr. Inoue's Lecture on Rice: Part II]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991.

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References

• Asahi Nenkan 1994 [Asahi Yearbook 1994]. Asahi Shinbun Sha, Tokyo, 1993: 164–167.
• The Economist. “Starters-and-Stripes Sushi: Rice Production,” November 27, 1993: 30.
• The Economist. “The Voice of Rice: Korean for Protection,” Vol. 7841, No. 329, December 11, 1993: 33–34.
• The Economist. “Ricable: World Trade,” Vol. 7831, No. 329, October 2, 1993: 75–76.
• Freidland, Jonathan and Smith, Charles. “Staple of Dispute: Tokyo Hits at Concessions on Rice Trade,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 43, October 28, 1993: 22.
• Cramer, Gail L., Waules, Eric J., and Shui, Shangna. “Impact of Liberalizing Trade in the World Rice Market,” American Journal of Agricultural Economy, Vol. 75, February 1993: 219–226.
• Fukui, Yuki. “Japan Agriculture on the Rips,” Tokyo Business Today, Vol. 62, No. 12, December 1994: 28–29.
• Hasegawa, Hiroshi. “Read the Six Years; After the Opening Rice Market (Kome Koaiho Rokunengo O Yomu),” Asahi Shinbun Weekly AERA, December 20, 1993: 16–17.
• Hasegawa, Hiroshi. “Jiritsu Seyo Kome Noumin [Rice Farmers, Be Independent],” Asahi Shinbun Weekly AERA, November 22, 1993: 26–28.
• Machight, Susan. “Short Rice Crop Posed Challenges, Opportunities for Tokyo,” Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 37b, October 8, 1993: 8–10.
• Japan Agrinfo Newsletter, Vol. 11, No. 12, International Agricultural Council, Tokyo, August 1994: 5–6.
• Islam, Shanda. “A Deal of Sorts: GATT Comes Up with an 11th-Hour Global Trade Accord,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 50, December 23, 1993: 54.
• Japan Agrinfo Newsletter, Vol. 12, No. 6, International Agricultural Council, Tokyo, February 1995: 5.
• Smith, Charles. “Rice Resolve: Tokyo Makes Last-Minute Concession on Imports,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 50, December 23, 1993: 14.
• Smith, Charles. “Steamed Up: Japan’s Rice-Import Ban Stays Despite Shortfall,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 41, October 14, 1993: 73.
• Soda, Osamu. Fact about Japan: Japanese Agriculture. International Society for Educational Information, Tokyo, 1993: 1–8.
• Yamagata, Yuichiro. “Probing the Impact of the Uruguay Round,” Tokyo Business Today, April 1993: 34–36.
• Wander, Berber. “Rice Decision Strains Coalition Unity, Jeopardizes Political Reform,” Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 46b, December 17, 1993: 5–7.

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